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1. INTRODUCTION 
Direct commercial sales of arms and militarily critical goods and technologies 
by U.S. firms to foreign buyers are subject to controls imposed by the United 
States for national security and foreign policy reasons. Although the need for 
such controls is obvious, it is also clear that overly restrictive export laws would 
have an adverse impact on the country's economic health. Consequently, export 
controls endeavor to strike a balance between the government's needs and the 
competing interests of exporters in unencumbered trade. 
Congress has enacted legislation that governs exportation of arms and mili-
tarily critical goods and technologies; however, because the President has been 
delegated broad authority to act in this area, the federal agencies charged with 
administering the export laws are caught in a power struggle between the 
legislative and executive branches over trade policy regarding strategic goods.! 
The administrative agencies that make up the export control community imple-
ment the President's policies through the regulatory framework, but these regu-
• Partner, Pettit & Martin, Washington, D.C. 
•• Associate, Pettit & Martin, Washington, D.C. 
1. One of the most publicized clashes between Congress and the President over the exercise of power 
in the area of export control occurred when President Reagan amended the regulations controlling 
exports of oil and gas commodities and technical data to Russia to include exports of foreign-origin 
goods and technologies by U.S.-owned or controlled companies, and foreign-produced products utiliz-
ing U.S. technical data. See 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982). As a result, certain companies were denied 
export privileges based on alleged violations of the Export Administration Regulations. Congress 
proposed specific legislation to prohibit the President's action; however, the President yielded to public 
and political pressure and repealed all regulations prohibiting export to the Soviet Union of oil and gas 
transmission and refining commodities and technical data. 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982). 
The 98th Congress is presently considering a bill to amend the Export Administration Act. See H.R. 
3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (approved by House Foreign Affairs Comm. May 25,1983); see also 
S. 979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (counterpart bill to H.R. 3231). The bill would limit the President's 
authority to impose foreign policy controls through the following provisions: 1) the President would be 
required to report to Congress before the controls take effect; 2) controls could not have extraterritorial 
application unless specifically authorized by Congress; and 3) newly issued controls could not interfere 
with existing export contracts or licenses received before the date of implementation. An exception 
would exist for controls relating directly to international terrorism, acts of aggression, human rights 
violations. or nuclear weapons tests. 
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lations are subject to statutory constraints. Thus, when Congress disagrees either 
with an action taken by the President or with his failure to act, it may enact 
specific legislation to remove some of the President's discretion by imposing or 
lifting controls on the statutory level. 2 
The highly political nature of strategic trade has resulted in a patchwork of 
differing delegations of authority over export controls and inconsistent gov-
ernmental action, creating an uncertainty for U.S. exporters as to the legality of 
their actions. To make matters worse, the present system of export controls 
involves overlapping and confusing administrative responsibilities, particularly 
with respect to licensing approval and enforcement of the regulations that 
implement export policy.3 
There are two principal statutes that impose export restrictions on defense-
related or strategic goods: the Arms Export Control Act of 19764 and the Export 
Administration Act of 1979.5 Under the Export Administration Act, the De-
partment of Commerce, through the Office of Export Administration, has 
general jurisdiction over exports and re-exports of U.S.-origin commodities and 
technical data, and foreign products either containing U.S.-origin parts and 
components or based on U.S.-origin technical data. 6 The scope of authority 
delegated to Commerce to restrict exports differs, however, depending on the 
purpose for imposing the control. Other agencies have limited jurisdiction over 
particular categories of strategic goods.7 The Arms Export Control Act confers 
2. For example, the International Security Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, 95 Stat. 1519 (1981), 
curtails the President's authority to sell defense articles, extend credit for military sales, or grant export 
licenses under the Arms Export Control Act to or for the Government of Chile until the President 
certifies that Chile has made significant progress in the area of human rights and has taken steps to 
bring to justice the alleged murderers of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit. [d. at § 726, 95 Stat. 1554 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2311,2346-48,2370,2751 (1982)). 
3. H.R. 3231; supra note I, would continue the present system in which the Departments of Defense, 
Commerce, and State share the responsibility for export control policy and licensing. Proposals to shift 
responsibility to a single Department or a new Office of Strategic Trade were rejected. The bill would, 
however, increase Commerce's ability to enforce the Export Administration Act (see infra note 5) by 
giving it authority to execute warrants, search and seize export shipments, and bear firearms. At the 
same time, the bill would limit the enforcement authority of the U.S. Customs Service primarily by 
limiting its activity to preseizure targeted inspections, detentions, preliminary investigations, and sei-
zures, and by requiring it to forward cases to the Department of Commerce. 
4. Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C. (1982)). 
5. Pub. L. No. 96-72,93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1982)). The Act 
was due to expire on September 30, 1983. Congress, however, passed a temporary extension, and on 
October 14, President Reagan issued an Executive Order, pursuant to the International Economic 
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. V 1981), authorizing the continuation of the export regulations 
provided for in the Act. See Exec. Order No. 13,451,48 Fed. Reg. 56,563 (1983). As of this writing, the 
Act has not yet been reauthorized, but the regulations have remained in effect under this order. 
6. Authority for licensing commodities and technical data was committed to the Office of Export 
Administration by Exec. Order No. 12,002, 42 Fed. Reg. 35,623 (1977). 
7. Exports which are not controlled by the Department of Commerce are set forth in 15 C.F.R. 
§ 370.10 (1983). For example, the Maritime Administration, Department of Transportation, adminis-
ters export controls over certain watercraft of five net tons or more and vessels of war; the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission administers controls over exports of nuclear equipment, facilities, and mate-
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on the State Department, through the Office of Munitions Control,jurisdiction 
to control exports of munitions and other defense-related articles and services. 
These agencies have promulgated separate regulations to implement the stat-
utory authority delegated to them, but the jurisdictional lines are often blurred. 
Furthermore, export controls are subject to interagency review, and the en-
forcement of these controls also requires the involvement of other federal 
agencies, primarily the U.S. Customs Service and the Department of Justice. 
Thus, exporters of technology that could be used militarily may find their export 
activity regulated by either the Commerce or the State Department, monitored 
by the Defense Department, and investigated by four different agencies. 
This paper will discuss the current restrictions on commercial sales of muni-
tions and militarily critical goods and technologies, focusing on the inter-agency 
export control functions, the fractured licensing approval authority, and the 
enforcement of export controls by the various administrative agencies charged 
with regulating strategic trade. It will not discuss the national security and 
foreign policy decisions underlying export controls nor detail the specific licens-
ing procedures used by the agencies to effectuate these policy goals. The practi-
cal concerns for exporters of military-related articles and technologies are mostly 
on the administrative level; nevertheless, exporters should keep in mind that 
current foreign policy will always affect individual exporters because these policy 
decisions are implemented through the regulatory scheme. 
II. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT 
The President has broad discretion to impose and enforce export controls 
within the parameters of the export statutes. The extent to which strategic 
exports are controlled thus depends on current national security and foreign 
policy objectives. During the cold war, all exports to communist countries were 
restricted,8 but in the late 1960s, policies shifted away from strict control to an 
emphasis on export promotion.9 The Export Administration Act of 197910 
(EAA) recognized the importance of exports to the U.S. balance of trade and the 
ability of U.S. citizens to compete in international commerce. Accordingly, ex-
ports may be restricted only when controls are necessary to prevent exports from 
making a "significant contribution to the military potential of any other country 
... which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States," 
or from thwarting U.S. foreign policy or short supply objectivesY The adminis-
rials; and the Department of Energy administers controls over exports of natural gas and electric 
energy and re·exports of nuclear equipment and materials. 
8. Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11,63 Stat. 7 (1949) (originally codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2021·2032) 
(expired 1969 pursuant to Act of June 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89·63, 79 Stat. 209 (1965». 
9. For a discussion of U.S. export control policy, see Note, Recmuilintian of Canfiicting Goals in the Expart 
Administration Act of 1979 -A Delicate Balance, 12 LAW & POLICY INT'L Bus. 415 (1980). 
10. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. V 1981». 
II. EAA § 3(2), 50 U.S.c. app. § 2403-I(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
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trative licensing decision must be based on the relationship between the destina-
tion country and the United States rather than on its form of government, and 
no license may be denied, regardless of the destination, if the goods or 
technologies are available without restriction from sources outside the United 
States.12 
Although there may be both foreign policy and national security reasons for 
restricting particular exports, the EAA distinguishes the scope of the President's 
authority to act based on the purpose for which export control is sought. For 
exporters of strategic goods and technologies, the most significant controls are 
those imposed for national security reasons. 
A. General Licensing Authority of the Office of Export Administration 
Under the EAA, the Office of Export Administration (OEA) within the De-
partment of Commerce controls exports of all goods and unclassified technical 
data through licensing procedures described in the Export Administration Reg-
ulations.13 The regulations instruct exporters on the types of commodities and 
technical data under control and the types of licenses for which to apply. The list 
of commodities and countries subject to export control by the Department of 
Commerce is known as the Commodities Control List (CCL).14 
For each category of commodities, the CCL identifies those destinations that 
require a validated export license (as opposed to a general export license au-
thorization),15 the reason for control, and any dollar value limits. If export 
activity is permitted under a general license, no specific application is necessary 
and no documents are issued by the Department of Commerce.16 If a validated 
license is required, an exporter must apply to OEA for a permit to export to the 
particular destination for a particular end-use, and if approved, exportation may 
proceed only in accordance with the limitations specified in the license docu-
mentP Sometimes a third type of license, a qualified general license, may be 
obtained for multiple exports by a specific exporter for exports requiring less 
restrictive c;ontrols. At this writing, however, Commerce has proposed to tighten 
regulations governing multiple exports of potentially strategic products to non-
12. EAA § 4(c), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(I) (Supp. V 1981). 
13. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399.2 (1983). 
14. The CCL, set forth at 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1983), lists goods and technologies controlled lor 
reasons of national security and foreign policy and indicates by code letters the country groups to which 
controls apply. For example, Country Group "Z" includes North Korea, Vietnam, Kampuchea, and 
Cuba; Country Group "W" includes Hungary and Poland; and Country Group "T" includes most of 
North, Central, and South America. See 15 C.F.R. § 370 (Supp. 1 1983). 
15. See 15 C.F.R. § 371.1 (1983). 
16. In order to prevent export law violations, certain exports may require a "Shipper's Export 
Declaration," which certifies that the shipment meets the conditions of the general license authorization, 
and, if the commodity would require a validated license for export to a restricted destination, a 
"Destination Control Statement" on the shipping documents. 15 C.F.R. § 386 (1983). 
17. 15 C.F.R. §§ 372.6(a)(2), 372.9 (1983). 
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communist countries. IS Exporters must keep in mind that licenses are also 
required for re-exports,I9 that is, when U.S.-origin goods are shipped from one 
foreign destination to another. 
In determining whether to grant an export license to a controlled destination, 
OEA considers the following factors: kinds and qualities of commodities and 
technologies to be shipped, their military and civilian uses, the unrestricted 
availability abroad of the same or comparable items, the country of destination, 
and the intended end-use.2o Generally, applications for exports of any goods or 
technologies to Country Group "Z" (North Korea, Cambodia, Cuba, and Viet-
nam) will be denied while exports to Country Group "Y" (Russia and some of its 
satellites) are subject to strict scrutiny. Occasionally, a complex license applica-
tion presents difficult policy problems and cannot be handled routinely by OEA. 
In that event, the application is referred to another agency, a technical advisory 
committee,21 or to the Operating Committee level of the Advisory Committee 
for Export Policy (ACEP)22 for their recommendation. If OEA rejects the in-
teragency recommendation, the application is referred to higher levels within 
the ACEP or to the Export Administration Review Board. 
Whenever OEA rejects a license application, the exporter must be notified 
within five days. Once an application is denied or a license revoked, the exporter 
has the right to appeal the decision to the Assistant Secretary for Trade Adminis-
tration.23 In addition, a license applicant has the right to enforce the time 
periods mandated by the Act for the licensing process.24 
18. See Tougher Rules on High-Tech Exports Asked, Washington Post, Jan. 19, 1984. At the same time, 
Congress is proposing a new "comprehensive operations license" authorizing multiple shipments by 
U.S. firms with good records of export compliance. See H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
19. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 374.1-374.9 (1983). 
20. 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(a) (1983). 
21. Technical advisory committees are established by the Secretary of Commerce to assist on matters 
involving unilateral or multilateral export control of technical data and production technology. Exam-
ples of commodities covered by technical advisory committees include computer systems and compo-
nents, electronic instrumentation, and telecommunications equipment. Procedures and criteria for the 
establishment and operation of technical advisory committees are set forth in 15 C.F.R. § 390.1 (1983). 
22. The Advisory Committee for Export Policy (ACEP) operates at five levels: I) the Operating 
Committee of the ACEP, which is made up of senior staff and is chaired by a Commerce official; 2) the 
Sub-ACEP, at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level, which is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Export Administration; 3) the ACEP, at the Assistant Secretary level, which is chaired by the 
Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration; 4) the Export Administration Review Board, at the 
Secretary level, which is chaired by the Secretary of Commerce and includes the Secretaries of State and 
Defense; and~ 5) the President, who has final authority to resolve all interagency disputes. Membership 
in ACEP includes representatives from the Departments of Commerce~ Defense, State, Energy, Trans-
portation, and Treasury, the National Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other 
agencies as is appropriate (although not all those listed are voting members on each issue). Other 
agencies may be invited to participate when matters of interest to them are under consideration. The 
system is designed to operate on a consensus basis; a failure to agree at any level moves a policy issue or 
licensing decision to the next higher level. 
23. 15 C.F.R. § 389.2 (1983). 
24. EAA § 1O(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(j) (Supp. V 1981). 
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B. National Security Controls and the Role of the Defense Department 
As discussed above, the EAA confers on the President authority to impose or 
continue export controls at his discretion on the basis of the intended recipient's 
communist or non-communist status and its belligerent or friendly relationship 
with the United States and its allies. The Act, however, includes certain provi-
sions that limit this discretion. For example, the Act requires the Secretary of 
Commerce to review the CCL annually25 in order to minimize controls and 
ensure that the country groups appearing on the list are in accordance with 
current U.S. policies. In addition, the Act prohibits OEA from denying a license 
application or imposing export controls if it determines that the goods or 
technologies at issue are available from foreign sources in sufficient quantity and 
quality to make the denial of the license or maintenance of controls ineffective, 
unless doing otherwise would be detrimental to the national security of the 
United States.26 Finally, the Act mandates that the CCL be narrowly defined 
through an indexing system,27 which increases performance levels of goods and 
technologies subject to national security controls. This measure was intended to 
provide a systematic means of removing controls as the controlled items become 
obsolete.28 The indexing system was not intended, however, to decontrol items 
that, though obsolete by U.S. standards, would contribute to the military poten-
tial of a U.S. adversary.29 Thus, the system would be appropriate for computers 
but not munitions or nuclear technology. 
The Department of Commerce does not possess exclusive jurisdiction over 
exports controlled for national security reasons. The EAA authorizes the De-
partment of Defense to review such license applications and to determine in 
consultation with Commerce which applications will be subject to DOD review.30 
This authority does not extend to non-communist countries. Generally, DOD 
will review only those applications that raise acute national security concerns. If, 
however, DOD recommends denial of a license, Commerce cannot ignore it. 
Only the President can overturn a DOD decision, and when he does, he must 
report his decision to Congress.31 Consequently, if DOD determines that the 
items to be transferred are strategic or militarily critical, these export licenses will 
not be approved even if Commerce obtains end-use statements declaring that the 
25. EAA § 5(c)(3), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(k) (Supp. V 1981). 
26. EAA § 5(f), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f) (Supp. V 1981). 
27. EAA § 5(g), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(g) (Supp. V 1981). 
28. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1979). 
29. Extension and Revision of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearings and Mark-up BeJore the 
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess., pt. 1, 647, 692 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Revision of the EAA]. 
30. EAA § lO(g)(I), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(I), (2) (Supp. V 1981). 
31. EAA § 10(g)(2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(3), (4) (Supp. V 1981). In fiscal year 1982, 1,675 
applications were reviewed bilaterally by the Commerce and Defense Departments, and no referrals to 
the President were necessary. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REpORT 
27 (1983). 
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items will not be used for military purposes. Furthermore, a license can be 
approved on the belief that the goods or technologies are available from foreign 
sources or that they will not be used for military purposes. Such licenses can be 
withdrawn upon discovery that the exports are being diverted for military use or 
upon reassessment of the export's foreign availability, strategic status, or adverse 
effect on national security.32 
In 1977, DOD adopted an approach to national security export controls33 that 
shifted the focus from end products to militarily critical technologies that trans-
fer design and manufacturing know-how.34 This approach recognizes that all 
technologies are not of equal military value and need not be controlled to the 
same degree.35 Congress endorsed the strategic technologies approach when it 
enacted the EAA and directed DOD to develop a Militarily Critical Technologies 
List,36 to be used in the export license approval process, and eventually incorpo-
rated into the CCL. The Secretary of Defense has primary responsibility for 
developing the Militarily Critical Technologies List, but the Secretary of Com-
merce must agree on those items to be placed on the CCL.37 
The EAA provides DOD with broad guidelines for developing the Militarily 
Critical Technologies List. Accordingly, the list must emphasize the following 
general categories of technologies: 1) arrays of design and manufacturing 
32. For example, export approval was withdrawn when U.S.-origin technology and equipment were 
llsed to produce trucks at the Soviet Kama River truck plant and these trucks were then used to invade 
Afghanistan. See Kama River Truck Factory: Best and Worst of Technology Export, INDUS. RESEARCH & DEV. 
56 (1980). Since that time, the license requirements for export of engine assembly lines to the Kama 
River complex have been expanded to include technical data for the manufacture of trucks. Licenses 
for these exports will generally be denied. None were issued in 1982. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REpORT (1983). 
33. Memorandum from Harold Brown, Sec. of Defense, to Secretaries of the Military Dep'ts, Interim 
DOD Policy Statement on Export Control of U.S. Technology (Aug. 26, 1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Interim DOD Policy Statement on Export Control of U.S. Technology], reprinted in Transfer of Technology 
and the Dresser Industries Export Licensing Actions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate 
Comm. on Government Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 90-92 (1978). The purpose of the new policy was to 
protect U.S. lead-time in the application of technology to military capabilities. Thus, in its 1977 policy 
statement, DOD advocated tighter controls over a broad range of technology transfers. For a thorough 
discussion of the development of the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), see Note, National 
Security Protection: The Critical Technologies Approach to U.S. Export Control of High-Level Technology, 15 J. 
INT'L LAw AND ECON. 575 (1981). 
34. Critical technologies consist of know-how in fields of science or engineering that, if acquired by a 
potential enemy, would contribute significantly to its military potential. Hearings on Revision of the EAA, 
supra note 29, at 405 (prepared statement of Ruth M. Davis, Deputy Director of Defense for Research 
and Advanced Technology). 
35. Id. at 403. H.R. 3231, supra note I, would encourage the eliminating of lower technology from 
both the MCTL and the CCL due to foreign availability. 
36. EAA § 5(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d) (Supp. V 1981). The MCTL identifies militarily significant 
goods and technologies which, in DOD's determination, should not be exported to controlled countries. 
45 Fed. Reg. 65,014 (1980). 
37. In the event that DOD and Commerce disagree on items to be placed on the CCL, the President 
has the responsibility for resolving the disagreement. EAA § 5(c)(2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)(2) (Supp. 
V 1981). 
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know-how; 2) keystone (revolutionary technological advances) manufacturing, 
inspection, and test equipment; and 3) goods accompanied by sophisticated 
operation, application, or maintenance know-how not possessed by countries to 
which exports are controlled and which, if exported, would permit a significant 
advance in a military system of any such country.38 Currently, there are eighteen 
specific categories of technologies listed.39 Within this framework, it is DOD's 
policy that sales of end products to potential U.S. adversaries should be recom-
mended only where: 1) the product'S technology content is either difficult, 
impractical, or economically infeasible to extract; 2) the end product will not of 
itself significantly enhance the recipient's military or warmaking capability, 
either because of its technology or the quantity to be sold; and 3) the product 
cannot be analyzed so as to reveal U.S. system characteristics and thereby con-
tribute to the development of countermeasures to equivalent U.S. equipment.4o 
Although the Militarily Critical Technologies List is primarily used by DOD in 
license application reviews, it has been updated and much of its supporting 
documentation reformatted in hopes of enhancing use of the list and its support-
ing documentation by all agencies involved in the export control process'" 
One particular problem in controlling strategic technology exports is the 
problem presented by transfers of computer software. Demand is strong for U.S. 
exports of automatic data processing equipment; such equipment cannot be 
exported without programs and technical instructions,, 2 As a result, Commerce 
has issued special licensing regulations for computer software.43 These regula-
tions require exporters to submit detailed information on proposed exports so 
that OEA can determine when software and technical instructions would trans-
fer militarily critical technologies. The required information includes an expla-
nation of why the software must be exported in that form, the scope of personnel 
training and maintenance proposed, and the relationship of programs to the 
end-use of the data processing equipment.44 
38. EAA § 5(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d) (Supp. v 1981). These guidelines for developing the MCTL 
are identical to those set forth in the 1977 Interim DOD Policy Statement on Export Control of U.S. 
Technology, supra note 33. 
39. Seventeen categories were included in the initial list, and an eighteenth category was added in the 
second revision of the MCTL published on October 1, 1982. 
40. Interim DOD Policy Statement on Export Control of U.S. Technology, supra note 33, at 92. 
41. To date, the initial list published in the Federal Register has not been integrated with the CCL as 
required by section 5(d)(5) of the EAA; however, H.R. 3231,supra note 1, would require integration by 
1985. 
42. See Gold, Goodman & Walker, Software Recommendationsfor an Export Control Policy, ACM COM 
179-200 (1980). 
43. 15 C.F.R. § 376.10 (1983). In addition, the MCTL includes eleven categories of software 
technology. 45 Fed. Reg. 65,016 (1980). 
44. 15 C.F.R. § 376.1O(a) (1983). 
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C. Foreign Policy Controls: The Role of the State Department 
In addition to the export controls imposed for national security reasons, the 
EAA authorizes the President to restrict strategic and nonstrategic export ac-
tivities as necessary to further U.S. foreign policy.45 Although national security 
controls are likely to embody foreign policy as well as national security objectives, 
the EAA provides for separate controls based solely on foreign policy concerns 
without regard to whether the exports would contribute to the military strength 
of a potential enemy. In other words, the purpose of these controls is to further 
specific U.S. foreign policy objectives such as human rights and anti-terrorism. 
As a result, these controls change with every administration.46 
Examples of foreign policy controls include: 1) the embargo on exports to 
South Africa and Namibia of aircraft, certain computers, commodities and 
technical data for use by military or police entities, and all items controlled by the 
United Nations arms embargo to South Africa; 2) control over strategic goods 
valued at $7 million or more destined for military end-use, certain aircraft, and 
other military-related equipment to Libya, Yemen, and Syria; 3) the embargo on 
most commercial exports to Cuba, North Korea, Kampuchea, and Vietnam; and 
4) control over exports to the USSR of equipment and technical data for oil and 
gas exploration and production.47 
The State Department is authorized by statute to identify those items to be 
controlled for foreign policy reasons, with the concurrence of the Department of 
Commerce.4S Whenever foreign policy controls are imposed, however, the Pres-
ident must notify Congress of the decision and the reasons for imposing con-
trols. 49 Although the Act contains no provisions for a congressional veto of new 
foreign policy controls, it does provide for automatic expiration of such controls 
unless specifically extended. In addition, the Act mandates that the President, 
before imposing any controls through the State Department, consider the prob-
ability that the controls will achieve their intended foreign policy purposes in 
light of the following factors: I) foreign availability; 2) compatibility of the 
proposed controls with overall foreign policy objectives of the United States; 
3) the reaction of other countries to such controls; 4) the likely effects of the 
controls on exports, employment, and the competitive position and reputation of 
the United States; 5) the ability of the United States to enforce the controls 
effectively; and 6) the foreign policy consequences of failing to impose con-
45. EAA § 3(2)(B), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403-1(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
46. In 1982, the Secretary of State determined that, pursuant to current Administration policies, Iraq 
should be deleted and Cuba added to the list of countries providing repeated support for international 
terrorism. 
47. These regulations have been the subject of considerable controversy. See supra note I. 
48. EAA § 6(k), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c) (Supp. V \98\). 
49. EAA § 6(e), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) (Supp. V 1981). 
312 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VII, No.2 
trols.50 No comparable restriction exists on DOD decisions for national security 
controls. 
As part of its jurisdiction over foreign policy controls, the State Department 
has the right to review export license applications. Unlike licenses issued with 
national security controls, however, Commerce can issue licenses for articles 
controlled for foreign policy purposes without State Department approval,51 
although, as a practical matter, Commerce issues such licenses only after State 
has agreed. 
D. Multilateral Export Controls Over Military Articles 
In 1949, the United States and six allies created an informal Consultative 
Group on Export Controls, and the following year the Group formed a Coor-
dinating Committee (CoCom) to develop, review, and update lists of goods 
embargoed from export to communist countries from CoCom members.52 The 
Consultative Group no longer exists, but CoCom continues as an informal trade 
organization whose function is to coordinate unilateral controls imposed by its 
members53 on exports of military goods to communist countries. 
Each member country is responsible for implementing, through domestic 
legislation, the CoCom list of goods embargoed because of their strategic military 
value to communist powers. CoCom approval of exports on its list is required on 
a case-by-case basis.54 Thus, after the Departments of Defense and Commerce 
have approved a validated license to export strategic goods on the CoCom list, 
the application must go through a second approval process. The EAA provides, 
however, that if multilateral review has not resulted in a determination within 
sixty days, the approval of the Secretary of Commerce becomes final. 55 
E. Enforcement 0/ the EAA 
Export controls are of course only as effective as their enforcement. The EAA 
prohibits violation of the Act and its implementing regulations and provides 
certain criminal penalties for noncompliance.56 In addition, the Department of 
50. EAA § 6(b) , 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (Supp. V 1981). 
51. EAA § 6(a), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
52. CoCom maintains three embargo lists: the International Atomic Energy List, the International 
Munitions List, and the International List, which contains dual-use items not included in the other lists. 
53. CoCom members include the U.S.,Japan, and all members of NATO except Ireland and Spain. 
54. The necessity for CoCom approval has been criticized as hampering U.S. trade, and the United 
States is currently taking action to promote uniform implementation of export controls by CoCom 
members. For a discussion of CoCom policy and its effectiveness, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REpORT 
TO CONGRESS, EXPORT CONTROLS: NEED TO CLARIFY POLlCY AND SIMPLIFY ADMINISTRATION 10, 15 
(Mar. I, 1979). 
55. EAA § lO(h) , 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(h) (Supp. V 1981). 
56. EAA § II(a), (b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 241O(a), (b) (Supp. V 1981). H.R. 3231, supra note 1, would 
more clearly define those acts which constitute violations of the export laws. 
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Commerce may impose civil sanctions in accordance with the enforcement provi-
sions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).s7 The same conduct can 
give rise to both criminal and civil liability. An exporter's activity thus may 
trigger simultaneous investigations by several agencies, or it may be the subject 
of an investigation initiated by Commerce alone, but later referred to Justice for 
prosecution. 
I. Policing the Export Laws 
On May 18, 1982, the investigative division was removed from the Office of 
Export Administration and elevated to office status.58 The new Office of Export 
Enforcement (OEE) strengthened its enforcement capabilities by expanding its 
present field offices in New York, opening two new field offices on the West 
Coast,59 and working in cooperation with other agencies responsible for inves-
tigating and enforcing export regulations, particularly the U.S. Customs Service. 
OEE functions primarily in investigations of license applications, allegations of 
wrongdoing, and inspections of shipments. When OEE learns of a possible 
violation, it evaluates the information received to determine whether the allega-
tion is sufficient to warrant investigation or compliance action and to establish 
primary investigative responsibility.60 Frequently OEE shares intelligence with 
Customs, which has the primary responsibility for investigating violations of the 
Arms Export Control Act.6l 
According to the Department of Commerce, Commerce is particularly con-
cerned with preventative enforcement.62 Thus, OEE reviews export license 
applications to prevent potential violations, conducts pre-license checks on the 
suitability of intended recipients, and employs the U.S. Foreign Service to inves-
tigate the probable disposition of shipments for which applications are pend-
ing.63 As expected, the most difficult problem for OEE is enforcement of con-
trols over transfers of technical data, particularly computer software. 
Customs officials are authorized to examine all goods and technologies de-
57. EAA § II(c), 50 U.S.C. app. § 241O(c) (Supp. V 1981). 
58. The function of the former compliance division of the Office of Export Administration was 
transferred to a new office and titled the Office of Export Enforcement, which is on the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary level. 
59. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REpORT 55 (1983). 
60. A longstanding battle between OEE and Customs over authority to conduct foreign investiga-
tions has recently been the subject of congressional debate in connection with re-authorization of the 
Export statute. See supra note I. At this writing, it is expected that Commerce and Treasury will sign a 
memorandum of understanding which would concede both agencies authority in this area, but would 
acknowledge Commerce as the main liaison between investigating agencies. See International Trade 
Reporters, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 547 Van. 17, 1984). 
61. Customs enforces laws administered by the State Department concerning exports of arms, 
ammunition, implements and other munitions of war. 19 C.F.R. § 161.2(a)(l) (1983). 
62. INT'L TRADE ADMINISTRATION, OVERVIEW OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM 16 
(1981). 
63. [d. 
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clared for export, demand for inspection any necessary export documents, and 
seize commodities shipped in violation or attempted violation of the EAA or its 
regulations.64 OEE inspectors are authorized to physically examine and detain 
questionable shipments.65 In addition, Customs officers are authorized to seize 
commodities shipped in violation or attempted violation of the EAA. Vehicles 
used to transport such commodities are also subject to seizure and forfeiture. 66 
When OEE has completed an investigation, the case may be closed for lack of 
evidence or appropriate compliance action may be taken. Depending on the 
nature of the violation, compliance action may consist of a simple warning letter 
for minor infractions or more severe administrative sanctions, such as a civil fine 
up to $100,000 or denial of export privileges for a specified time.67 Unless the 
Department of Justice is conducting its own investigation or the matter has been 
referred there by another agency, the decision to pursue criminal penalties will 
not be made until OEE's investigation is complete. The decision whether to 
prosecute, however, is entirely within the discretion of the Department of Jus-
tice .68 
2. Sanctions 
Criminal penalties under the EAA may be imposed for three different types of 
conduct. First, anyone who knowingly violates any provision of the Act or the 
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) may be fined up to $50,000 or five 
times the value of the exports involved, whichever is greater.69 Second, anyone 
who wilfully violates any provision of the Act or the EAR, with knowledge that 
the exports will be used to benefit a country to which exports are controlled for 
national security or foreign policy purposes, may be: 1) fined not more than five 
times the value of the exports involved or $1,000,000 in the case of a non-
individual; or 2) fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than ten 
years or both in the case of an individual.70 These latter penalties also apply to 
individuals and non-individuals that have been issued a validated license to 
export to a controlled country and that, with knowledge that the exports will be 
64. 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 161.2(b) (1983); 15 C.F.R. § 386.8 (1983). 
65. EAA § 12(a), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(a) (Supp. V 1981). In 1982, OEE inspectors detained 584 
questionable shipments. 
66. 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 161.2(b) (1983); 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b)(4) (1983). 
67. EAA § ll(a)-(c), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a)-(c); 15 C.F.R. § 387.1 (1983). In 1982, out of 268 
completed investigations, eight cases were referred to the Commerce Department's Office of General 
Counsel for initiation of the administrative proceedings necessary to impose civil sanctions, and thirteen 
cases were referred to the Department of Justice for possible criminal prosecution through the courts. 
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REpORT 55 (1983). 
68. Frequently, the Justice Department will prosecute simultaneously for violations of the EAA and 
the Arms Export Control Act, as well as for conspiracy, fraud, and tax evasion. See U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, 1982 EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REpORT 57-58 (1983). 
69. EAA § ll(a), 50 U.S.C. app. § 241O(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
70. EAA § ll(b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b) (Supp. V 1981). 
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used for military or intelligence gathering purposes contrary to the conditions 
under which the license was obtained, wilfully fail to report such use to the 
Secretary of Defense.71 
The EAA allows all agencies exercising any functions under the Act to impose 
civil fines not to exceed $10,000 for each violation of the Act or any regulation, 
order, or license issued under it, except that fines not to exceed $100,000 may be 
imposed for violations of national security controls or controls on defense arti-
cles and services imposed under the Arms Export Control ACt. 72 These penalties 
may be imposed in addition to or in lieu of any other criminal or civil sanction. It 
is advisable for penalized exporters to pay their fines because payment may be a 
condition for up to a year to the granting or restoration of an export privilege. 73 
The Department of Commerce is also authorized to bring a civil action to recover 
the fines. 
Pursuant to its authority to administer the EAA, Commerce may take other 
action appropriate to enforce compliance with the export regulations. These 
administrative sanctions include denial of export privileges, exclusion from 
practice before the Domestic and International Business Administration of the 
Department of Commerce, and seizure of the unlawful exports, as well as civil 
fines. 74 The EAR specifies which activities are punishable by administrative 
sanctions, including direct violations of the regulations, aiding and abetting 
another in violation of the regulations, making false statements to the OEA, and 
trafficking in export documents. 75 Exporters may be liable also for violations 
committed by third parties in connection with export documents within their 
control. 76 
Aside from the penalties authorized by the EAA, every misrepresentation on a 
license application or shipping document is punishable by a $10,000 fine or 
imprisonment up to five years or both under the False Statements Act.77 More-
over, failure to report income from unauthorized export activities is subject to 
liability under the income tax laws. Finally, exporters should note that there are 
other serious repercussions for noncompliance with the export laws. First, a 
conviction or civil judgment may be grounds for debarment from contracting 
with the United States,18 and second, enforcement actions may result in disclo-
sure of otherwise classified information. OEA often requires considerable in-
formation to complete its review of license applications or to answer the ques-
71. [d. 
72. EAA § lI(c), 50 U.S.C. app. § 241O(c) (Supp. V 1981). 
73. EAA § lI(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(d) (Supp. V 1981). 
74. 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b) (1983). 
75. 15 C.F.R. §§ 387.1-.14 (1983). 
76. 15 C.F.R. § 387.2 (1983). 
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). 
78. Grounds for debarment include making false statements and committing any offense indicating a 
lack of business integrity. DAR 1-605.2 (1983); FAR 9.406-2 (1984). 
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tions of other reviewing agencies. The information submitted in connection with 
a specific export application ordinarily is nondisclosable under the Act in order 
to protect the exporter's business interests. However, if an exporter is prosecuted 
for criminal violations of the export laws or if administrative proceedings are 
initiated against an exporter, details regarding the license application may be 
disclosed publicly.79 
3. Administrative Proceedings 
The regulations set forth the procedures that must be followed whenever the 
Department of Commerce intends to impose administrative sanctions.80 Ad-
ministrative proceedings are initiated by service of a "charging letter" which 
alleges the essential facts of the specific violation charged. The respondent must 
answer the charges within thirty days or be held in default, and the allegations 
deemed admitted.8' The respondent has a right to an oral hearing, which is 
conducted by a presiding officer, but judicial rules of evidence and procedure do 
not apply to these hearings.82 Although the regulations authorize the use of 
subpoenas by both parties to obtain documents and provide that all relevant 
evidence will be received, it should be noted that, under the EAR, respondents 
may be precluded from inspecting classified materials entered into evidence by 
the government.83 
If there is insufficient evidence to support the charges, the presiding officer 
will dismiss the matter; otherwise, the officer will issue an appropriate order. 
Before hearings commence, the parties by agreement may propose that the 
presiding officer issue a consent order.84 If the officer rejects the proposal, the 
matter proceeds into hearings. Respondents have the right to appeal any deci-
sion denying export privileges or imposing a civil penalty, but there are only 
three grounds UpOIl which an appeal can be based,85 with requests to issue, 
79. Section 12(c)(I) of the EAA exempts confidential information submitted by exporters from 
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). However, nothing in the Act 
prohibits disclosure in the context of enforcement proceedings. 
80. 15 C.F.R. §§ 388.1-.22 (1983). 
81. 15 C.F.R. § 388.8(a) (1983). A respondent against whom a default order has been issued may 
apply to set aside the default for good cause shown. 15 C.F.R. § 388.8(b) (1983). 
82. Section 11(c)(2) of the EAA requires only that administrative hearings be carried out in accor-
dance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1982). 
83. 15 C.F.R. § 388.11 (1983). 
84. If the parties enter into a consent agreement, the exporter's penalty may be suspended in whole 
or in part provided that the company complies with the EAR during the suspension period. See, e.g., 
In re Chicago International Trading Company (order of bee. 22, 1981 pursuant to consent agreement), U.S. 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REpORT 58-59 (1983). 
Id. 
85. 15 C.F.R. § 388.22 (1983). The grounds for appeal are as follows: 
(1) That a necessary finding of fact is omitted, erroneous or unsupported by substantial 
evidence of record; 
(2) That a necessary legal conclusion or finding is contrary to law; 
(3) That the decision or the extent of sanctions is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 
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amend, or revoke a regulation not subject to the appeals process.R6 An appeal 
must specify which ground is being invoked and must be filed with the Assistant 
Secretary for Trade Administration within thirty days after receipt of a copy of 
the order. A hearing before the Assistant Secretary is not a trial de novo; rather, 
the appeal is limited to the record as developed before the presiding officer.87 
Furthermore, an appeal will not stay the operation of any order. Where the 
appellant so requests or the Assistant Secretary believes it to be necessary, the 
appellant may be granted an opportunity for an oral presentation.8s 
In addition to any administrative sanction which may be imposed at the 
conclusion of a hearing, the Department of Commerce can obtain temporary 
sanctions which will remain in effect during the pendency of the hearing. 89 A 
temporary denial order can be imposed at the time the charging letter is issued. 
Such an order prohibits the respondent from participating directly or indirectly 
in any transaction involving a validated export license. The charging letter may 
also suspend or revoke any outstanding validated license and require its return 
for cancellation. 
To issue a temporary denial order of export privileges, the Department of 
Commerce must conclude that such an order is required: 1) to permit or 
facilitate enforcement of the EAA; 2) to avoid circumvention of administrative 
or judicial proceedings; or 3) to permit the completion of an investigation. 90 
The order is issued summarily, without prior notice or opportunity for hearing, 
and it is valid for a limited period of time, ordinarily not to exceed thirty days or 
as may be required to complete the investigation or the proceeding. 91 An appli-
cation for a temporary denial order is made by the OEE to the presiding officer. 
The officer will review the application and approve it, in whole or in part, or 
deny it. Any respondent subject to a temporary denial order can move to vacate 
or modify the order. This motion is filed with the presiding official whose 
decision on the matter is final. 92 
III. ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT 
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) authorizes the President to control 
exports of munitions and other defense articles and services and to designate 
which items will be subject to control. This list of restricted items is known as the 
86. 15 C.F.R. § 389.3 (1983). In addition, promulgation of rules implementing the EAA are exempt 
from the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. EAA § 13(a), 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2412(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
87. 15 C.F.R. § 389.2(4) (1983). 
88. 15 C.F.R. § 389.2(3) (1983). 
89. 15 C.F.R. § 388.19 (1983). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. A list of parties currently subject to denial and probation orders affecting export privileges is 
published in 15 C.F.R. § 388 (Supp. 1, 2 1983). 
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United States Munitions List. 93 The President must review the Munitions List 
periodically to determine whether any items should be added or removed, and 
any decision to remove an item must be reported to Congress before that item 
can be removed from the list.94 
The AECA requires that all commercial firms engaged in manufacturing or 
exporting articles on the Munitions List register with the federal government, 
regardless of whether they actually import or export such articles.95 The Act 
further prohibits any firm from engaging in export activities involving any item 
on the Munitions List without first obtaining an export license.96 The State 
Department, through the Office of Munitions Control (OMC), is responsible for 
administering the AECA. The OMC's implementing regulations are known as 
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (IT AR).97 Although a detailed 
description of the entire IT AR is beyond the scope of this paper, a general 
discussion of the IT AR is necessary for the reader to understand the relationship 
between the AECA and the EAA, and the enforcement problems which these 
regulations present to potential exporters. 
A. General Overview of the IT AR 
The IT AR imposes a licensing system, enumerates what exports are subject to 
that system, outlines the steps necessary t.o gain approval of export activities by 
the State Department, exempts certain exports from its requirements, and spec-
ifies the procedures for enforcing its provisions. The State Department has the 
discretion to issue export licenses, temporary export licenses, and intransit 
licenses for three categories of exports: 1) unclassified arms, ammunition, and 
implements of war (defense equipment on the Munitions List); 2) manufacturing 
license and technical assistance agreements (agreements by which U.S. citizens 
either grant persons in foreign countries the right to manufacture abroad defense 
equipment on the Munitions List or furnish foreign persons with technical 
assistance in connection with the manufacture abroad of such equipment); and 
3) unclassified technical data and classified data and equipment.98 The OMC has 
93. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1983). The Munitions Ust is divided into eighteen categories: firearms; 
artillery and projectors; ammunition; missiles, rockets, torpedos, bombs and mines; propellants, incen-
diaries and explosives; vessels of war; tanks and military vehicles; aircraft and spacecraft; military 
training equipment; protective personnel equipment; military and space electronics; fire control and 
guidance and control equipment; auxiliary military equipment; nuclear weapons design and test 
equipment; classified articles; technical data relating to articles in other categories; submersible vessels 
and oceanographic equipment; and miscellaneous articles having significant military applicability. 
94. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982). 
95. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(l) (1982). Registration requirements and procedures are set forth in 22 
C.F.R. Part 122 (1983). 
96. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2) (1982). 
97. 22 C.F.R. Parts 121-130 (1983). OMC proposed a revision to the ITARon December 19, 1980,45 
Fed. Reg. 83,970-95; however, the proposal has yet to be promulgated. 
98. 22 C.F.R. Parts 123, 124, &: 125 (1983). 
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considerable discretion to deny, revoke, suspend, or amend any license,99 al-
though applicants and licensees have a limited right to challenge the denial of a 
license application or the revocation, suspension, or amendment of an outstand-
ing license. The IT AR requires the State Department to notify applicants and 
licensees promptly of adverse decisions and the reasons therefor, and it accords 
the adversely affected applicant or licensee an opportunity to present additional 
information and obtain review of the matter by the Department. 1oo 
There are numerous exemptions to the licensing requirement for the first 
category of exports, i.e., defense equipment on the Munitions List. For example~ 
the IT AR authorizes Customs to permit the following exports of defense equip-
ment without a license: 1) shipments between the United States and U.S. pos-
sessions and the Panama Canal Zone; 2) certain equipment destined for Canada; 
3) firearms manufactured before 1898; 4) sample shipments of non-automatic 
firearms that are not for sale and will be returned to the original owner; 5) minor 
components for firearms not exceeding $100 per transaction; 6) certain propel-
lants and explosives; 7) a maximum number of non-automatic firearms and 
cartridges per U.S. citizen or resident alien if the firearms are intended exclu-
sively for personal use (hunting or self-protection), are not for resale, and are 
not being exported permanently; and 8) nuclear materials to the extent that they 
are controlled by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 101 In addition, a com-
modity may be exempt from AECA licensing ifit has a dual use, i.e., military and 
nonmilitary, in which case it would be licensed by the Department of Com-
merce. 102 
Once a license has been obtained for exporting defense equipment, but prior 
to actual shipment, the export license must be filed with the district director of 
the U.S. Customs Service at the port where shipment of the goods will be made, 
or with the postmaster at the post office where the goods will be mailed. 103 In 
addition, exporters must file a Shippers Export Declaration with the Customs 
director or postmaster even if an export license is not required. In that event, the 
declaration must certify that the proposed export is exempt from the license 
requirement and identify the section of the IT AR under which the exemption is 
claimed.104 All unused, expired, suspended, amended, or revoked licenses must 
99. An export license may be denied or revoked whenever the State Department believes such action 
would further world peace, national security, or foreign policy. 22 C.F.R. § 123.05(a) (1982). All three 
categories of exports are subject to a prohibition against shipments to or from certain communist 
countries and from areas where it has been deemed contrary to U.S. foreign policy. 
100. 22 C.F.R. § 123.05(b), (c) (1983). 
101. 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.30, 123.38 (1983). 
102. The Export Administration regulations specifically exempt from their scope items on the 
Munitions List, 15 C.F.R. § 370.10 (1983), which is included in the EAR as Supplement 2 to Part 370. 
However, Commerce can assume jurisdiction if the State Department determines that an item has a 
civilian use and its intended end-use is non-military. 
103. 22 C.F.R. § 125.53 (1983). 
104. For example, § 123.30 permits small arms manufactured before 1898 to be exported without a 
license. 22 C.F.R. § 123.30 (1983). 
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be returned to the Department of State, and failure to return immediately a used 
or lapsed temporary license constitutes a violation of the IT AR.105 
One important provision of the IT AR section governing exports of defense 
equipment is the requirement for OMC approval as a condition precedent to any 
proposal or presentation designed to provide the basis for an informed decision 
to purchase "significant combat equipment"106 on the Munitions List if: 1) the 
equipment would be sold under a contract for $7 million or more; 2) the 
equipment is intended for use by the armed services of a foreign country; and 
3) the sale would involve the export of an item on the Munitions List or technical 
data relating to an item on the Munitions List. lo7 In other words, a potential 
exporter who meets these three criteria must obtain OMC approval before 
making a sales presentation, although prior approval is not necessary for adver-
tising, market surveys, or notification of the availability of an item of significant 
combat equipment. lOB 
Every application for a license to export significant combat equipment in 
connection with a transaction that meets the three criteria must be accompanied 
by a reference to the approval granted by the OMC or a certification that no 
proposal or presentation requiring prior approval has been made. 109 Failure to 
obtain the requisite approval for a proposal or sales presentation may constitute 
a reason for disapproving a subsequent license application,uo The converse, 
however, is not necessarily true. OMC approval does not mean that the agency 
will also approve a license application to export the equipment that was the 
subject of the proposal. 
The second category of exports regulated by the IT AR consists of agreements 
between U.S. exporters and persons of foreign countries to provide technical 
information and know-how possessed by the exporter, which would enable such 
foreigners to manufacture abroad items on the Munitions List.lll As with de-
fense equipment, the IT AR requires prior OMC approval before a prospective 
exporter can make a proposal or sales presentation1l2 if: 1) the subject of the 
proposal or presentation is a technical assistance or manufacturing license 
agreement for the overseas production of significant combat equipment on the 
105. 22 C.F.R. § 123.55(g) (1983). 
106. "Significant combat equipment" is defined at 22 C.F.R. § 121.03 (1983), and includes certain 
articles (not including technical data) enumerated in the Munitions List categories. 
107. 22 C.F.R. § 123.16 (1983). 
108. 22 C.F.R. § 123.16(b) (1983). 
109. 22 C.F.R. § 123.16(c) (1983). 
110. 22 C.F.R. § 123.16(e) (1983). 
111. 22 C.F.R. Part 124 (1983). Sales representation agreements, however. are not subject to State 
Department approval. 
112. A "proposal or presentation designated to constitute a basis for a decision to purchase" is not 
limited to a formal sales presentation. Rather, it includes any communication of information in 
sufficient detail that the communicating person should have known that it would permit an intended 
purchaser to decide to enter into the proposed technical assistance or manufacturing license agreement. 
22 C.F.R. § 124.06(b) (1983). 
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Munitions List; 2) the equipment is intended for use by the armed forces of a 
foreign country; and 3) the agreement would involve the export of any item on 
the Munitions List or of technical data relating to an item on the Munitions 
List. 113 Unlike the other categories of exports, however, a license is not required 
to export unclassified technical data in furtherance of an approved manufactur-
ing license or technical assistance agreement unless the technical data to be 
exported exceeds the technical or product limitations in the agreement ap-
proved by the State Department. Rather, exporters meeting the criteria of this 
section submit requests for approval of manufacturing or technical assistance 
agreements accompanied by either a reference to an approval previously 
granted or a certification that no proposal requiring approval has been madeY4 
Offshore procurements are exempt from the requirements of this section of 
the ITAR in certain circumstances. Accordingly, a person in the United States 
may make arrangements to manufacture equipment on the Munitions List in a 
foreign country without OMC approval, provided: 1) the delivery of equipment 
is only for use of the U.S. exporter or an agency of the Department of Defense; 
2) the foreign manufacture is pursuant to a contract for delivery of equipment 
only to the U.S. exporter or a federal agency; 3) the contract limits the use of 
technical data to that required by the contract, prohibits the disclosure of data 
except to duly qualified subcontractors for equipment within the same country, 
prohibits the acquisition of any rights in data by foreign persons without State 
Department approval, and requires subcontracts to contain the above-described 
limitations and prohibitions; and 4) the U.S. exporter provides OMC with a copy 
of each executed subcontract. II5 
The third category of exports includes unclassified technical data and 
classified information, i.e., equipment or technical data which has been assigned 
a U.S. security clearance.116 Export licensing requirements for this category 
apply not only when such data or information is exported in the normal sense of 
the word, but also when it is disclosed to foreign nationals abroad or in the United 
States.117 Two important exemptions from these licensing requirements are 
classified information delivered solely for the foreign use of U.S. citizen employ-
ees of U.S. firms, if the firm has complied with DOD's Industrial Security 
Manual, and classified information disclosed during a DOD-approved visit by a 
foreign national, again if the U.S. firm has complied with DOD's Industrial 
Security Manual. 118 Because of the separate agency functions, the United States 
113. 22 C.F.R. § 124.06(a) (1983). 
1l4. 22 C.F.R. § 124.06(c) (1983). 
115. 22 C.F.R. § 124.20 (1983). 
116. 22 C.F.R. Part 125 (1983). 
117. 22 C.F.R. § 125.03 (1983). Disclosure extends to plant visits and participation in briefings and 
symposia. 
118. 22 C.F.R. § 125.11 (1983). In addition, the ITAR identifies seven exempt categories of 
unclassified technical data: 
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may permit strategic trade with countries to which exports of Munitions List 
commodities are strictly controlled or prohibited.119 In other words, there may 
be a complete embargo on military shipments to a country that is classified in a 
CCL country group which requires only a general license authority, the least 
restrictive method of export licensing.120 Thus, it is usually advantageous for an 
exporter to have an article considered nonmilitary or "dual use." In cases where 
an article is not clearly included on the Munitions List, an exporter may apply for 
a commodity jurisdiction ruling, being alert to the fact that policy in this area is 
subject to frequent changes.121 
B. Enforcement 
The AECA and the IT AR make it unlawful for anyone to violate any provision 
of or contribute to the commission of any act prohibited by the AECA and the 
regulations, licenses, and orders issued under it. Specifically, the regulations 
prohibit anyone from exporting or attempting to export any article or technical 
data for which a license or approval is required from the State Department.122 In 
addition, anyone who knows that another person is debarred or suspended from 
export privileges under the AECA is prohibited from applying for, obtaining, or 
using an export control document, or participating in any export transaction 
Id. 
(1) Data which has already been publicly released; 
(2) Data which export will further either a previously approved manufacturing license or 
technical assistance agreement, or a V nited States government contract; 
(3) Data relating to small caliber firearms; 
(4) Data relating to items which have previously been approved for export; 
(5) Data being reexported to the original source of import; 
(6) Data in support of a "V.S. Government approved project;" and 
(7) Data exported solely for the use of American citizen employees of a Vnited States firm. 
119. For example, exports to Chile of items on the Munitions List are prohibited. However, Chile is 
classified in country group "T" for purposes of the Commodities Control List, and exports to this 
country group are generally unrestricted. 
120. See supra note 1 02. 
121. For example, the State Department has lifted the embargo on exports of defense-related goods 
and technologies to Argentina. 
122. Exporters should be aware that criminal penalties can be imposed for the unauthorized export 
of technical data "relating to" items on the V .S. Munitions List. The courts have been in disagreement as 
to the exact meaning of "relating to." In United States v. Van Hee, 531 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1976), the court 
held that a conviction could be premised on the disclosure of general technical knowledge. In other 
words, you can be held criminally liable for the disclosure of technical data which relates only generally 
to items on the V.S. Munitions List; the technical data need not specifically relate to items on the Iist.Id. 
at 356-57. More recently, however, in United States v. Edler Indust., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978), the 
court held that there must be more than a mere general relationship between the item on the Munitions 
List and the technical information which is disclosed. Specifically, the court held that conviction is 
permissible only for the "exportation of technical data significantly and directly related to specific articles 
on the Munitions List." Id. at 521 (emphasis added). In United States v. Wieschenberg, 604 F.2d 326 (5th 
Cir. 1979), the court also gave a more limited construction to the statute. The court there reversed a 
conviction of conspiracy to violate the AECA and IT AR. The court ruled that mere discussion of an 
illegal act (exporting an item on the Munitions List without an export license) is not sufficient to warrant 
a conspiracy conviction. Id. at 335-36. There must be some act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. 
1984] EXPORT CONTROLS 323 
involving a controlled article or technical data, for the benefit of such debarred 
or suspended person.123 The regulations also make it unlawful to use any 
document containing a false statement or material omission for the purpose of 
obtaining an export permit from the OMC.124 The false statement or material 
omission not only will be a violation of the IT AR and the AECA, but also will 
subject the exporter to liability under the False Statements ACt.125 
Finally, the IT AR makes it clear that an attempt to export or remove from the 
United States any article on the Munitions List in violation of the export licensing 
regulations is an offense also punishable under section 401 of title 22 of the U.S. 
Code.126 Accordingly, whenever there is possible cause to believe a violation has 
occurred or is about to occur, the U.S. Customs Service is authorized to seize and 
dispose of such articles and any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft involved in the illegal 
act. 127 
Several sanctions can be imposed on an exporter for violating the AECA or 
failing to comply with the regulations. In addition to forfeiting articles seized by 
Customs, a person who wilfully violates the export licensing provisions of the 
AECA or the IT AR, or who wilfully makes an untrue statement or omits a 
material fact in any registration, license application, or report required by the 
Act or the regulations, may be fined up to $100,000 or imprisoned not more 
than two years or both.128 Interestingly, these penalties are less severe than the 
corresponding penalties for criminal violations of the export laws administered 
by the Department of Commerce.129 Moreover, two basic civil sanctions are 
authorized by the IT AR: civil fines and suspension or debarment from export-
ing activities.130 This authority is, however, rarely invoked. 
The OMC Enforcement Division is not staffed to investigate or try alleged 
export violations. In practice, most cases involving illegal exports of arms and 
defense-related goods regulated by OMC are criminal matters initiated by the 
Justice Department; the majority of these cases involve "gun running" to foreign 
countries. l31 It is the responsibility of the U.S. Customs Service to conduct 
123. 22 C.F.R. § 127.01(b) (1983). 
124. 22 C.F.R. § 127.02 (1983). 
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). 
126. 22 C.F.R. § 127.06 (1983). 
127. In contrast to the enforcement authority under the Export Administration Act, primary author-
ity to investigate illegal shipments of defense-related articles and services is delegated to U.S. Customs 
officials. 22 C.F.R. § 127.05 (1983). 
128. AECA § 38, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982). 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71. To constitute an offense under the AECA, the 
alleged conduct must be wilful. There is no sanction imposed for knowingly violating the Act as there is 
under the AECA. 
130. 22 C.F.R. §§ 127m, 127.10 (1983). 
131. The most recent example of this is the highly publicized Edmund Wilson case involving 
shipments of rifles to Libya. United States v. Wilson, 565 F. Supp. 1416 (S.D. N.Y. 1983). See also United 
States v. Swarovski, 592 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1979) (export of military aircraft gunsite camera to the Soviet 
Union); United States v. Cahalane, 560 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1977), em. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978) (export 
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investigations, with assistance from OMC, and forward the resulting information 
to the Justice Department.132 If the Justice Department determines there is 
evidence sufficient to warrant prosecution, the government will bring criminal 
charges against the exporter in federal court. 133 
It is only in certain rare instances, when the Justice Department either 
declines to prosecute or reaches a settlement agreement with the exporter 
pursuant to which the government drops the criminal charges in lieu of a civil 
penalty, that OMC will bring charges of its own. In fact, OMC has concluded 
only three actions,134 and all three have been settled by consent order rather 
than by proceeding through the formal administrative procedures set forth in 
the regulations. 
Nevertheless, the regulations authorize the Director of the Bureau of 
Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department to debar persons from export-
ing items subject to the licensing requirements of the AECA and IT AR if the 
debarment is based on one of four specified grounds.135 Before a decision to 
debar an exporter is made, the Director of OMC can order a temporary debar-
of rifles to Ireland); and United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1976) (export of rifles to Ireland). 
Because this is a criminal proscription, however, the government must prove specific intent to violate 
the AECA or the ITAR. United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lizarraga-
Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1976); Etheridge v. United States, 380 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1967). Finally, 
courts have held that conviction is not barred on the theory that the U.S. Munitions List is unconstitu-
tionally vague, SwarllVslci, 592 F.2d 131, and also have held that 22 U.S.C. § 2778 does not violate the 
second amendment right to bear arms, United States v. Gurrola-Garcia, 547 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1976). 
132. 19 C.F.R. § 161.2(a)(l) (1983). 
133. The Attorney General is required to inquire into cases reported to him by Customs officers and, 
if necessary, to prosecute such cases in U.S. district court. 19 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). Exporters violating 
the AECA may also find themselves charged with conspiracy; tax evasion and fraud. 
134. The first of these actions, In re Olin Corp., No. MC 78-f,~U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, MUNITIONS 
CoNTROL NEWSLETTER No. 67 (Dec. 27, 1978), arose out of an earlier criminal conviction for violation of 
the AECA. After Olin pled no contest and was fined in the criminal case, OMC initiated a debarment 
action which was settled by a consent decree. The decree debarred Olin for a period of sixty days, put 
Olin on probation for a period of one year starting with the end of the debarment period, and required 
Olin to Inake available to OMC a wide variety of records. The second action, In re Smith f5 Wesson Co., 
No. MI02, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, MUNITIONS CONTROL NEWSLETTER No. 70 (Mar. 20, 1979), was initiated 
by OMC. This action also was settled by a consent decree after Smith and Wesson pled no contest. While 
not debarred, Smith and Wesson was fined $120,000 and was required to make available a wide range of 
records for OMC inspection. The final action, In re Applied Systems Corp., U.S DEP'T OF STATE MUNITIONS 
CoNTROL NEWSLETTER No. 97 (Sept. 30, 1982) (consent order), originated as a criminal investigation 
during which the parties agreed that the proceedings against the exporter would be terminated if the 
Department of State agreed to impose a civil penalty. Unlike the other two civil actions, this matter was 
disposed of completely outside the agency's administrative procedures because the exporter agreed to 
waive its procedural rights. The decree simply imposed on Applied Systems a fine of $10,000. 
135. Debarment is authorized if based on the following grounds: 1) Conviction under 22 U.S.C. 
n 2778 and 2779, or any rule or regulation issued thereunder; 2) A violation of22 U.S.C. § 2778 when 
a violation is such as to provide a reasonable basis to believe that the violator cannot be relied upon to 
comply with relevant laws; 3) A second or subsequent violation which impels the belief that the violator 
cannot be trusted to comply with relevant laws; or 4) A decision by the Department of Commerce to 
suspend, deny or revoke export practice before the Bureau of East-West Trade provided that the 
Hearing Commissioner makes a factual finding that the facts reasonably impel the conclusion that a 
person cannot be relied upon to comply with relevant laws. 22 C.F.R. § 127.07(a) (1983). 
1984) EXPORT CONTROLS 325 
ment by issuing an order of interim suspension. To do SO, the Director of OMC 
must conclude that at least one of the four stated grounds for debarment exists 
and that an interim suspension is reasonably necessary "to protect world peace or 
the national security or foreign policy of the United States."136 Suspension can be 
for no more than sixty days, but the order does become effective immediately, 
without prior notice and hearing. Any person who is subject to an interim 
suspension order can ask for a hearing on the matter, and the Director of the 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs ultimately will decide the matter. 
Permanent debarments, on the other hand, are subject to an extensive set of 
procedural rules. Most importantly, a permanent debarment cannot be made 
without notice and a hearing. These debarments, however, are not subject to the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554.137 To initiate a permanent 
debarment action, the Director of OMC sends a letter stating the charges. The 
charged person (the respondent) then has thirty days in which to answer and can 
request an oral hearing. The answer must respond fully to the charging letter, 
and any allegations which are not contested will be deemed to be admitted.13s 
Failure to answer constitutes a default justifying the issuance of a permanent 
debarment order. 139 
Permanent debarment cases are not tried before a State Department tribunal, 
but before the Hearing Commissioner for the Bureau of East-West Trade in the 
Department of Commerce. Both the government and the respondent are enti-
tled to discovery, and the hearing officer has su bpoena power. 140 Upon comple-
tion of discovery, a pre-hearing conference is held, followed by the hearing. The 
hearing is not subject to the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law. 
Instead, "all evidentiary material relevant and material to the inquiry will be 
received and given appropriate weight."14l 
After the hearing, the hearing commissioner prepares a report stating 
findings of fact and law, conclusions as to whether a violation has occurred, and 
specific recommendations. The report is then reviewed by the Director of OMC, 
and if "the evidence is not sufficient to support the charges," the director will 
dismiss the matter. The hearing commissioner can also dismiss the case. 142 When 
the Director of OMC concludes, however, that a violation has occurred, this 
conclusion is only advisory; the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military 
Affairs makes the final decision on debarments. 
The hearing commissioner may grant a rehearing at any time to hear any 
136. 22 C.F.R. § 127.08 (1983). 
137. 22 C.F.R. § 128.oJ (1983). 
138. 22 C.F.R. § 128.03 (1983). 
139. 22 C.F.R. § 128.04 (1983). 
140. 22 C.F.R. § 128.06 (1983). 
141. 22 C.F.R. § 128.08 (1983). If relevant evidentiary materials are classified, diligent efforts must 
be made to declassify them or to secure unclassified summaries or extracts. 
142. 22 C.F.R. § 128.10 (1983). 
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relevant and material evidence which was not known or obtainable at the time of 
the original hearing,143 and a respondent has the right to appeal from any final 
debarment or imposition of a civil penalty. The appeal, which must be filed 
within thirty days, is heard before the Appeals Board of the Commerce Depart-
ment,144 and the decision of the Appeals Board is final. 145 Unlike under the 
Export Administration Act, however, appeals under the Arms Export Control 
Act may not be taken from denials of license applications. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Dissatisfaction with the administration of export controls has prompted Con-
gress to propose improvements to the present system. At this writing, however, 
all proposals to confer upon a single agency the responsibility for controlling 
strategic trade have been rejected because it is believed that the present system is 
necessary to ensure that economic, national security, and foreign policy consid-
erations will be weighed fully in export control decisions. Although the existing 
problem of interagency turf fights may be alleviated by redefining each agency's 
authority, the fragmentation of administrative functions and the differing licens-
ing procedures will continue to present difficulties for exporters, particularly in 
the area of militarily critical technology. In addition, the broad delegation of 
authority to regulate exports in strategic goods and technologies will necessarily 
continue to cause policy conflicts between the political branches. Thus, exporters 
should carefully monitor policy changes which are implemented through the 
various export control mechanisms. 
143. 22 C.F.R. § 128.12 (1983). 
144. 22 C.F.R. § 128.13 (1983). As with appeals from adverse actions under the EAA, an appeal will 
not stay any final debarment order, and it must be based on one or more of the following grounds: 
1) that the findings of violation are not supported by any substantial evidence; 2) that prejudicial 
error law was committed; or 3) that the provisions of the order are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion. [d. 
145. [d. 
